

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Circuit Clerks
All Probate Judges
All Sheriffs

FROM: Callie Dietz, Administrative Director of Courts
Griffin Sikes, Jr., Legal Director, AOC



DATE: September 30, 2008

SUBJECT: Use of AOC data to erroneously disqualify voters and voter applicants

We have recently learned that information about criminal convictions in our state provided by the AOC from our electronic databases to Election Systems and Software, Inc. (ES&S)¹ has been and is currently being used to erroneously disqualify or disenfranchise Alabama citizens of their right to vote and/or their right to register to vote.

During 2007 and 2008, ES&S has been regularly using AOC data to generate and provide reports, including documents called "Weekly Felony Checks," to the boards of registrars reporting the names and other identifying information of persons convicted of certain criminal offenses for the purpose of determining voters' or voter registrants' right to vote or register to vote.

¹ Electronic Systems and Software, Inc. is a national voting system management company headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska. The State of Alabama contracted with ES&S in 2007 to assist the state in meeting the requirements of the "Help America Vote Act of 2002" (HAVA), codified at 42 U.S.C. 15301 to 15545.

HAVA, among other things, requires that all states establish a central, statewide, computerized, voter registration system which:

- a. contains the name and address of every legally registered voter in the state;
- b. serves as the single, official system for maintaining this voter list;
- c. can be immediately accessed by local election officials to electronically add or remove voters;
- d. complies with the provisions the National Voter Registration Act governing the removal of voters from this list and must be coordinated with other state agency databases to facilitate the removal of deceased persons and other persons ineligible to vote under state law from the voter list or registry;
- e. shall be maintained and supported by the Chief Election Officer of the state;
- and
- f. shall assure that eligible voters are not wrongfully removed from voting lists.

In recent months, several circuit clerks and others have reported to the AOC that the boards of registrars in their counties had disqualified voters or persons applying to vote based on these reports from ES&S about criminal convictions that do not constitute a proper or lawful basis for disqualification of the voter or voter registrant.

At the bottom of this problem is the issue of what felony convictions disqualify a person from voting under Alabama law.

Under Amendment 579 to the Alabama Constitution, persons who have been convicted of a “felony involving moral turpitude” are disqualified from voting. However, the phrase, “felony involving moral turpitude,”² is ill-defined and ambiguous. Neither the Legislature nor the appellate courts of this state have stated or provided a definitive listing of the felonies which “involve moral turpitude.”

This memo is intended to (a) assist you with inquiries from your board of registrars about whether any particular voter or person applying to register to vote in your county is or is not disqualified to vote as a result of their previously having been convicted of a felony; and (b) also, and perhaps more importantly, to assist you and your board or registrars in identifying any persons who during the past 18 months have been wrongfully denied their right to vote or their right to register to vote and notifying such persons that, contrary to what they may have been previously told, if otherwise qualified, they are eligible and entitled to vote in the coming November 4, 2008 general election.

In order to understand how and why ES&S has provided incorrect information to the boards of registrars, it is useful to review some of the history of the implementation of the state’s electronic voting system.

² The history in this state of the use of the phrase, “involving moral turpitude,” is instructive. The phrase, “persons convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude,” was used in Section 182 of the 1901 Alabama Constitution as a basis for disqualifying such persons from voting in Alabama. However, in *Hunter v. Underwood*, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) the United States Supreme Court held that the employment of this phrase – “crime involving moral turpitude” – in the Alabama Constitution was “motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race,” 471 U.S. at 224, and that when this standard was used as a basis for disqualifying citizens of the right to vote, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Subsequently, in the mid-1990s, Amendment 579 to the Alabama Constitution was ratified. This Amendment resurrected a portion of this phrase by modifying it from “crimes involving moral turpitude” to “felonies involving moral turpitude,” as a basis for again disqualifying or disenfranchising Alabama citizens of their right to vote.

Since the mid-1990s, this phrase remained the law in Alabama although the meaning, scope and breadth of the phrase have remained ill-defined and ambiguous.

In the spring of 2007, Governor Riley, having been previously appointed as Special Master by the federal court in *U.S. v. State of Alabama*, Case No. 2:06-cv-392-WKW, U.S. D.Ct., M.D.Ala., was charged with assisting the court in overseeing the State's compliance with HAVA.

This appointment of the Governor by the federal court divested the Secretary of State of what would have normally been the Secretary's responsibilities in overseeing the implementation of the state's electronic voting system by ES&S and placed these responsibilities in the Governor's Office.

As a part of setting up the electronic voting system required by HAVA, the Governor needed a listing of the felonies that involved moral turpitude under Alabama law in order to specify which felony convictions should be supplied by ES&S to the boards of registrars.

Determining what the law is or interpreting law is, of course, a duty entrusted to the judicial branch of government. However, in the first half of 2007, at the direction of Mr. Ken Wallis, the Governor's Chief Legal Advisor, the Governor's Office, a part of the executive branch of government, developed a list of felonies that he or his office believed to "involve moral turpitude" and provided this list ("the Governor's list") to ES&S.

However, after the Governor's Office made its determination of these felonies and provided it to ES&S, the Secretary of State then insisted that it be the judicial branch and not the Governor's Office that made the determinations of what felonies involved moral turpitude.

Mr. Wallis then asked the AOC, which is a part of the judicial branch of government, to approve the Governor's list of felonies involving moral turpitude previously compiled by that office.

The Legal Director for the AOC, Griffin Sikes, disagreed with the list of felonies involving moral turpitude supplied to ES&S by the Governor's Office. The attached letter, dated November 8, 2007, was sent by Mr. Sikes in response to Mr. Wallis' request. Appended to the end of this letter is a listing of the felonies determined by the AOC to have previously been declared by an appellate court, the Legislature or an Attorney General's opinion to involve moral turpitude.

The difference between the list of felonies that Mr. Wallis or his office believed to involve moral turpitude and the list of felonies involving moral turpitude contained in the AOC's letter of November eighth letter is substantial.

Of the approximately 575 felonies existing under Alabama law, Mr. Wallis' office's list included approximately 480 felony offenses that he or that office's attorneys believed would involve moral turpitude.

However, the AOC Legal Division found only approximately 70 felonies that had been held or determined by an Alabama statute, appellate court opinion or Attorney General's opinion to involve moral turpitude. Again, the list of these 70 felonies is appended to Mr. Sikes' November 8, 2008 letter.

The AOC's approach to this issue was and is that unless there is affirmative legal authority for disqualifying a voter or voter registrant, every citizen has the right to vote.

Based on the representations made by the Governor's Legal Counsel and ES&S, the Secretary of State's office and the AOC believed that only convictions of the felonies on the AOC's list were being provided to the boards of registrars by ES&S for the purpose of determining voters' eligibility to vote and voter applicants' eligibility to register to vote.

As late as the first week in September, 2008, Ms. Brown and Mr. Sikes were again reassured by Mr. Wallis and Ms. Curtis that the *only* criminal convictions that were being provided by ES&S to the boards of registrars throughout the state were the convictions for the 70 felonies on the AOC list; and that it was *only* these felonies that the boards of registrars were using to disqualify voters or voter applicants.

We now know that these repeated assurances were not accurate. Within the last week, we have received information, which Mr. Wallis has confirmed, that these assurances were "in error." Contrary to these assurances, ES&S is currently and has been for the past year or more providing information to the boards of registrars about criminal convictions from the Governor's list in documents titled, "Weekly Felon Checks,"³ and that the boards of registrars were and are incorrectly using these convictions to disqualify voters or voter applicants from voting.

Last week, the Governor was released by the federal judge as Special Master in the federal law suit and the responsibility for administering the state's voting system and laws was returned to the Secretary of State.

Yesterday, we met and conferred with Ms. Jean Brown, the Chief Counsel for the Secretary of State, and Mr. Adam Thompson, the State HAVA Director for the Secretary of State's Office, regarding these issues and concerns.

³ While these "Weekly Felon Checks" list the names and addresses of the persons convicted, their dates of birth, the last 4 digits of their social security numbers, the conviction dates, as well as other information, they do not identify the felony that was involved in the conviction.

We have been recently advised that "around the end of October" ES&S will put the "crime conviction codes into system" and these codes will thereafter begin to appear on these reports.

Both Ms. Brown and Mr. Thompson expressed their commitment to correcting any erroneous information regarding felonies involving moral turpitude being provided by ES&S; and in fact, have already contacted ES&S regarding getting this accomplished.

Further, they are undertaking to work with ES&S on an expedited basis to identify any persons who since the inception of the electronic voting system's implementation may have been incorrectly told that they are ineligible to vote or removed from the voter rolls or incorrectly denied their right to register to vote; and to immediately notify such persons that, if these denials were in error, that they are eligible to vote, or to register to vote, as the case may be.

We look forward in the next week to working with Ms. Brown and Mr. Thompson and others in the Secretary of State's office to ensure that every citizen who is qualified to register and vote is allowed to do so.

END OF MEMO



ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS

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Sue Bell Cobb
Chief Justice

Callie T. Dietz
Administrative Director of Courts

November 8, 2007

Kenneth D. Wallis, II, Esquire
Chief Legal Counsel
Office of the Governor
State Capitol, Suite NB-05
Montgomery, AL 36130

Re: U.S. v. State of Alabama and Beth Chapman
Case No. 2:06-cv-392-WKW (U.S.D.Ct., M.D. Ala.)

Dear Mr. Wallis:

You requested that the Administrative Office of Courts determine and provide you with a list of the felonies "involving moral turpitude," the conviction of which would disqualify and disenfranchise state citizens of their right to vote under Amendment 579 to the Alabama Constitution.

Prior to making those determinations for this office, I researched and reviewed the history and case law interpreting and defining the meaning of the phrase, "involving moral turpitude," and the history and case law involving the right to vote.

I herewith report to you the results of this research and provide you with the determinations and the listing of offenses that you requested.



a.

Alabama case law interpreting the meaning of “involving moral turpitude”

The phrase, “involving moral turpitude,” is ambiguous, elastic, and subjective. It can cover virtually any criminal offense that a person employing this vague and imprecise standard wants it to cover. It contains an inherent bias in favor of inclusion: the “higher” one’s moral standards are, the greater the number of offenses included.

The Supreme Court noted this phrase’s lack of definition, its imprecision and the requirement of interpretation to divine its scope in *Hunter v. Underwood*,¹ 471 U.S. 222 at 226 (1985):

This latter phrase [crime involving moral turpitude] is not defined, but was subsequently interpreted by the Alabama Supreme Court to mean an act that is “immoral in itself, regardless of the fact whether it is punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes, the moral turpitude.” *Pippin v. State*, 197 Ala. 613, 73 So. 340, 342 (1916)

¹ In *Hunter v. Underwood*, the United States Supreme Court held that the employment of this phrase, “crime involving moral turpitude,” in Section 182 of the 1901 Alabama Constitution, was “motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race,” 471 U.S. at 224, and that when this standard was used as a basis for disqualifying citizens of the right to vote, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In light of this, it is difficult to understand the decision made in the mid-1990s to reintroduce, via Amendment 579 to the Alabama Constitution, the phrase, “involving moral turpitude,” as a basis for again disqualifying or disenfranchising Alabama citizens of their right to vote. Nevertheless, this was the phrase used in Amendment 579, which, upon its adoption, resurrected this ill-defined set of criminal convictions as the basis for disenfranchising Alabama citizens of their right to vote. (We note that the phrase was modified in the Amendment to restrict the disenfranchising offenses to “felonies” involving moral turpitude rather than “crimes” involving moral turpitude.)

The use of this standard is suspect. While an Equal Protection claim alleging disenfranchisement of minority voters, such as that brought in *Hunter v. Underwood*, requires proof of discriminatory intent, a claim brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, does not. Section 2 of that Act requires only racially discriminatory effect or results, e.g., *Bush v. Vera*, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1995), “In 1982, Congress amended the VRA by changing the language of § 2(a) and adding § 2(b), which provides a “results” test for violation of § 2(a)” and *Nipper v. Smith*, 39 F.3d 1494, 1509-10 (11th Cir.1994), holding that Section 2 “outlaws election practices that result in racial discrimination.” (underlining supplied)

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Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit also recognized the lack of any definition of this standard and its extremely subjective nature in that Court's opinion below, Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 at 616 (1984):

The [Alabama] attorney general in opinion has acknowledged that classification of presently unaddressed offenses the "will turn upon the moral standards of the judges who decide the question."

This problem of the "classification of presently unaddressed offenses" remains extant, *i.e.*, the inability to readily determine which felonies "involve moral turpitude" and which do not persists. One need look no further than Opinion 2005-092 of the Attorney General of Alabama issued in 2005 or Chapman v. Gooden, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 98, decided less than six months ago, to appreciate the difficulty, subjectivity, ambiguity of the standard and the lack of objective criteria for these determinations.

In identifying the particular Alabama felonies which have been held in an Alabama appellate court opinion to "involve moral turpitude," our office has relied upon the case law research performed by Mr. Scott Rouse of your office which he kindly provided to me two weeks ago.

Most of the cases cited and relied upon by Mr. Rouse did not involve the issue of voter disqualification, but rather involved issues of the admissibility of evidence of a party or witness's conviction of a crime as impeachment evidence under §12-21-162(b),² or a person's disqualification to serve as a juror under §12-16-60, both of which statutes also use the phrase "involving moral turpitude" as their respective defining criteria.

² On January 1, 1996, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the Alabama Rules of Evidence. As noted by the Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules, "The preexisting Alabama statutory provision authorizing impeachment by evidence showing conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, Ala. Code 1975, §12-21-162(b), has been superseded by Rule 609." Rule 609 of those Rules has governed the admissibility of criminal convictions for impeachment purposes since January 1, 1996. Rule 609 does not employ a "moral turpitude" standard.

In adopting the Alabama Rules of Evidence, the Alabama Supreme Court thereby eliminated, at least in this context, the interpretive problems inherent in the "involving moral turpitude" standard. This has decreased the number of cases in which an Alabama appellate court has had the opportunity to further address the issue of what crimes or felonies "involve moral turpitude."

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Alabama cases in which the determination of whether a crime involved moral turpitude was made for the purpose of determining a citizen's right to vote – as opposed to impeachment purposes or the purpose of assessing the competency of a juror in a civil or criminal case – are almost non-existent. In compiling the list of felony offenses you requested, I have assumed, but do not opine, that the standard is the same for all three of these different purposes.

b.
The Right to Vote

From the earliest days of this nation's history and even in its pre-history, the right to vote has been understood and recognized to be of primal importance and among the greatest and most fundamental rights of its citizens.

Alexander Hamilton, one of the principal architects of the Constitution and the author of the majority of the Federalist Papers, stated as follows about the right to vote, its place in securing the rights of citizens, and more importantly for purposes of the present inquiry, the extreme circumspection and care that should be exercised in "divesting any citizen of that right":

A share in the sovereignty of the State, which is exercised by the citizens at large in voting at the elections, is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law. It is that right by which we exist, as a free people, and it will certainly therefore never be admitted that less ceremony ought to be used in divesting any citizen of that right than in depriving him of his property. Such a doctrine would ill suit the principles of the Revolution which taught the inhabitants of this country to risk their lives and fortunes in asserting their liberty, or, in other words, their right to a share in the government. Let me caution against precedents which may in their consequences render our title to this great privilege precarious.³ (underlining supplied)

³ Alexander Hamilton, *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Harold C. Syrett, ed. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962), Vol. III, pp. 544-545.

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Similar expressions of the fundamental importance of the right to vote in our system of government may be found throughout the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in the nineteenth and twentieth century, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886):

[T]he political franchise of voting is . . . regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.

Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 250 (1966) (*Fortas, dissenting*):

A vote is . . . the sacred and most important instrument of democracy and of freedom.

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992):

It is beyond cavil that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 59 L. Ed. 2d 230, 99 S. Ct. 983 (1979).

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214 (1992) (*Kennedy, concurring*):

Voting is one of the most fundamental and cherished liberties in our democratic system of government.

When this body of law, emphasizing the centrality and preeminence of the right to vote under the Constitution, is set alongside the ambiguous, ill-defined “involving moral turpitude” standard and its dubious, ignoble usage and history, the need for the care and circumspection cautioned by Hamilton in “divesting any citizen of that right” is patent.

Observing this caution, the Administrative Office of Courts is unwilling to extend the disenfranchisements of Alabama citizens of their right to vote beyond those citizens convicted of felony offenses which an Alabama appellate court opinion, a state statute or an opinion of the Alabama Attorney General has specifically by name determined to involve moral turpitude. To again quote Alexander Hamilton, this office declines to establish any “precedents which may in their consequences render our title to this great privilege precarious.”


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Using these three sources – Alabama case law,⁴ state statutes⁵ and Attorney General's opinions⁶ – we have compiled a list of Alabama felonies that have been identified by one of these sources to “involve moral turpitude.” I attach that list.

If you have any questions about these matters, please call or write me.

With kindest regards, I remain

Very truly yours,



Griffin Sikes, Jr.
Director, Legal Division

/GSjr

xc: Hon. Sue Bell Cobb, Chief Justice
Ms. Callie T. Dietz, Administrative Director of Courts
Hon. John William English, Jr., Probate Judge, Lee County
Winfield J. Sinclair, Esquire
Algert S. Agricola, Esquire
J. Dormand Walker, Jr., Esquire
Michael W. Robinson, Esquire
Robert D. Popper, Esquire
Scott L. Rouse, Esquire
Ms. Shannon M. Curtis
Robert L. McCurley, Jr., Esquire

⁴ In identifying the particular Alabama felonies which have been held in an Alabama appellate court opinion to “involve moral turpitude,” as previously stated, our office has used and relied upon the case law research provided by Mr. Scott Rouse of your office which he kindly provided to me two weeks ago.

⁵ The only statute addressing this issue that was cited to me by Mr. Rouse and the only such statute revealed in our research was §15-22-36.1, 1975, which provides a listing of felonies involving moral turpitude, the conviction of which will preclude an individual from applying to have his or her civil and political rights restored.

⁶ Opinion 2005-092 is the only such Attorney's General Opinion addressing this issue that was supplied or cited to me by Mr. Rouse.

Alabama felony offenses which have been declared or determined
by an Alabama appellate court, a state statute or an Attorney General's opinion
to "involve moral turpitude"

Code	Code section	Class	Category	Common Name
HOMI	014-314-	A	PE	MURDER (OLD CODE)
CM01	13A-005-040(A)(1)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-KIDNAP
CM10	13A-005-040(A)(10)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-TWO OR MORE PER
CM11	13A-005-040(A)(11)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-PUBLIC OFFICIAL
CM12	13A-005-040(A)(12)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-AIRPLANE HIJACK
CM13	13A-005-040(A)(13)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-20YR PRIOR CON
CM14	13A-005-040(A)(14)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-WITNESS
CM15	13A-005-040(A)(15)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-UNDER 14 YEARS
CM16	13A-005-040(A)(16)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-DWELL FR OUTSID
CM17	13A-005-040(A)(17)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-VEH FR OUTSIDE
CM18	13A-005-040(A)(18)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-FIRED FROM VEHI
CM02	13A-005-040(A)(2)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-ROBBERY
CM03	13A-005-040(A)(3)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-RAPE/SODOMY
CM04	13A-005-040(A)(4)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-BURGLARY
CM05	13A-005-040(A)(5)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-LAW OFF/GUARD
CM06	13A-005-040(A)(6)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-LIFE SENTENCE
CM07	13A-005-040(A)(7)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-FOR HIRE
CM08	13A-005-040(A)(8)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-SEXUAL ABUSE
CM09	13A-005-040(A)(9)	U	PE	MURDER CAPITAL-ARSON
MURD	13A-006-002	A	PE	MURDER
MURR	13A-006-002(A)(2)	A	PE	MURDER-RECKLESS/VEHICLE
FMUR	13A-006-002(A)(3)	A	PE	FELONY MURDER
MANS	13A-006-003	B	PE	MANSLAUGHTER
JJJ1	13A-006-020	B	PE	ASSAULT 1ST DEGREE
ASL1	13A-006-020(A)5	B	PE	ASSAULT 1ST DEGREE (LIQUOR)
ASS2	13A-006-021	C	PE	ASSAULT 2ND DEGREE
RAP1	13A-006-061	A	SX	RAPE 1ST DEGREE
RAP2	13A-006-062	B	SX	RAPE 2ND DEGREE
SOD1	13A-006-063	A	SX	SODOMY 1ST DEGREE
SOD2	13A-006-064	B	SX	SODOMY 2ND DEGREE
STSA	13A-006-065.1	A	SX	SEXUAL TORTURE/ABUSE
SXA1	13A-006-066	C	SX	SEXUAL ABUSE 1ST
SX2F	13A-006-067	C	SX	SEXUAL ABUSE 2ND DEGREE
ECHI	13A-006-069	C	SX	ENTICING CHILD TO ENTER
SX12	13A-006-069.1	B	PE	SEX ABUSE-CHILD LESS 12 YOA
SCBC	13A-006-110	B	PE	SOLICITATION OF CHILD BY COMPU
BUR1	13A-007-005	A	PR	BURGLARY 1ST DEGREE
BUR2	13A-007-006	B	PR	BURGLARY 2ND DEGREE
BUR3	13A-007-007	C	PR	BURGLARY 3RD DEGREE
TFT1	13A-008-003	B	PR	TOP1- SHOP LIFTING
TOD1	13A-008-003	B	PR	THEFT BY DECEPT 1ST
TOP1	13A-008-003	B	PR	THEFT OF PROP 1ST
TPC1	13A-008-003	B	PR	THEFT 1ST DEG - CHARITABLE ORG
TFT2	13A-008-004	C	PR	TOP2- SHOP LIFTING
TOD2	13A-008-004	C	PR	THEFT/DECEPTION 2ND
TOP2	13A-008-004	C	PR	THEFT OF PROP 2ND
TPC2	13A-008-004	C	PR	THEFT 2ND DEG - CHARITABLE ORG
TLP1	13A-008-007	B	PR	THEFT LOST PRTY 1ST
TLP2	13A-008-008	C	PR	THEFT LOST PRTY 2ND
TTTS	13A-008-010.4	C	PR	THEFT TRADE SECRET/TRADMARK

VIDE	13A-008-010.4	C	PR	THEFT TRADE SECRET/TRADMARK
ROB1	13A-008-041	A	PE	ROBBERY 1ST
ROB2	13A-008-042	B	PE	ROBBERY 2ND
ROB3	13A-008-043	C	PE	ROBBERY 3RD
FOR1	13A-009-002	B	PR	FORGERY 1ST
FOR2	13A-009-003	C	PR	FORGERY 2ND
TREA	13A-011-002	A	GP	TREASON
MIOB	13A-012-191	B	SX	PORN OBSCENE MATTER DISPLAY MI
POBM	13A-012-192(A)	B	SX	PORN INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
PMIO	13A-012-192(B)	C	SX	PORN POSS MATERIAL MINORS
MIPR	13A-012-196	A	SX	PORN PARENT/MINORS IN SEX
POMA	13A-012-197	A	SX	PORN-PRODUCING W/MINORS
PSMF	13A-012-200.2(1)	C	SX	OBSCENE MATERIAL-DIST/POSS
PISF	13A-012-200.2(2)	C	SX	OBSCENE MATERIAL-DIST/POSS WHO
PISP	13A-012-200.2(3)	C	SX	OBSCENE MATERIAL-PRODUCE
UDCS	13A-012-211	B	DR	UNLAW DISTRIB/FURN CONT SUBST
VSCO	13A-012-211	B	DR	SALE COCAINE
VSMA	13A-012-211	B	DR	SALE MARIJUANA
VAPF	13A-012-213	C	DR	POSS MARIJUANA 1ST
BIGA	13A-013-001	C	PE	BIGAMY
INCE	13A-013-003	C	PR	INCEST

End of List
