

**Mass Support for Redistricting Reform:
Partisanship and Representational Winners and Losers**

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“Most voters don’t know anything about redistricting and don’t care. They don’t see the lines.”
—Bruce Cain (quoted in Powell 2004)

This paper examines popular support for altering electoral institutions in two bellwether American states—California and Ohio. On Tuesday, November 8, 2005, a majority of voters in each state decisively struck down statewide ballot initiatives that would have created non-partisan redistricting commissions. California’s Proposition 77 would have amended the state’s constitutional process for redistricting California’s Senate, Assembly, and Congressional districts, reducing the power of the state legislature by having a three-member panel of retired judges selected by legislative leaders redraw the districts, with the proposed district boundaries then being referred to the statewide electorate for a popular vote. Championed by Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the initiative received only 40% of the popular vote.¹ Ohio’s Issue 4, which would have established a five member appointed board to oversee the drawing of legislative maps to ensure “competitive” redistricting, was sponsored by a coalition of Progressive non-profit organizations. The initiative won just 30% of the vote.² While the text and election results of the two redistricting proposals were similar, the political environment of the states was quite different. Following the 2000 US Census, California’s state Assembly, state Senate, and Congressional districts were gerrymandered by the Democratic-controlled state

¹ After failing to prod the state legislature to modify the way redistricting was conducted in the state, Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called for a special election and lead the charge—with his ballot measure committee, the California Recovery Team—raising millions of dollars to place Proposition 77 (as well as four other measures) on the November ballot.

² In the wake of Ohio’s close and highly contested 2004 presidential election, including concerns over the accuracy of the vote count, progressive reformers (Reform Ohio Now) qualified a slate of election reform initiatives for the state’s 2005 ballot. In addition to the non-partisan districting initiative (Proposition 4), Ohio’s ballot included initiatives to 1) create early voting and no excuse absentee voting, campaign finance reform; and 3) a non-partisan board to oversee elections in the state, effectively replacing the secretary of state for overseeing elections.

legislature to advantage Democratic candidates, whereas in Ohio, all three levels of legislative districts were gerrymandered to benefit Republican candidates.

A Voting Paradox

Despite widespread evidence that the public supports redistricting reform (Walters 2006), why did the two 2005 redistricting ballot measures fail—and fail by large margins? From a populist perspective, why wouldn't voters jump at the opportunity to minimize the power of their state legislators who control the process of drawing their own legislative districts as well as those of their compatriots in the US House of Representatives? Support for such an institutional reform might be akin to the widespread support for term limitation measures adopted by voters in multiple states in the 1990s (Benjamin and Malbin 1992; Donovan and Snipp 1994) and other governance policies restricting the power of elected officials, such as tax limitation and campaign finance reforms. For the most part, such measures have been easily approved by voters at the ballot box (Smith 1998; Tolbert 1998, 2003). Rather than having partisan legislators essentially choose their constituents through a politically-charged system of gerrymandering, we might expect voters—regardless of their political persuasions—who live in states without redistricting commissions to support institutional reforms intended to create more competitive legislative elections. In contrast to the 80% approval rates for term limitation initiatives in the 1990s, the redistricting ballot propositions received half this support? Why?

Thirty-eight states currently give sole authority to drawing state legislative boundaries to the legislature, with 26 states giving sole authority for redistricting congressional seats to the state legislature (McDonald 2006). In the remaining states, periodic redistricting of state and congressional districts is given to a bipartisan or nonpartisan board or commission, or is done

though a combination of legislative and commission bodies (McDonald 2004). It is quite possible that ordinary voters—like their elected officials (Boatright 2004)—may exhibit the same rational, self-interested calculus when given the opportunity to be policymakers for a day. Citizens may evaluate their vote choice on governance policies (Tolbert 2003), such as altering the method of carving legislative districts, as a strategic choice (Riker 1986). As with elected officials, citizens who are losers under the current institutional arrangement might vote strategically in favor of reforms so as to create new electoral rules to advantage themselves; winners, conversely, might act strategically to preserve the status quo.

After surveying the literature on winners and losers and offering a novel operationalization of these political concepts, we seek to determine whether a person's status as an electoral winner or a loser affects his or her support for an institutional change in the way legislative districts are drawn. Using unique and previously unexamined survey data from the California and Ohio 2005 elections, we explore how voters reason about institutional reform, assessing whether or not their status as representational winners or losers shapes their vote for redistricting reform. The two elections make for an intriguing comparative case study, as we are able to hold constant the mechanism (direct democracy) used to alter an electoral institution (redistricting), while varying the partisan context in each state (Democratic control of gerrymandering in California; Republican control of gerrymandering in Ohio). Through this natural controlled experiment, we are able to test hypotheses concerning an individual's status as a winner or loser in elections, as well as voting to change electoral institutions. We argue that being a winner or loser, as viewed through the conceptual prisms of partisanship and legislative representation at both the statewide *and* district levels, helps to explain why only a minority of voters supported the redistricting reform ballot measures.

Winners, Losers, and Self-Interested Voters

Scholars have found that alterations made to political institutions regulating electoral rules are relatively rare occurrences (see Lijphart 1984). Elected officials who control the process of electoral rulemaking are generally reluctant to alter the status quo, unless a change will clearly benefit them (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006; Grofman 1990; Rokkan 1970). Institutional change is inherently risky for elites (North 1990), especially for those who are (or at least perceive themselves to be) winners under the status quo. As a result, scholars have found that institutions, and the rules governing them, tend to evolve in such a way as to preserve the status of winners, or equilibrium (Riker 1962; 1982).

Losers are often defined in the literature as out-of-power politicians (Riker 1962), but here we define *voters* who are represented by politicians of a different political party as electoral losers (Donovan and Bowler 2004). As with recent cross-national research examining the relationship between winners and losers and their attitudes toward political institutions at the elite level (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2002, 2006; Anderson et al. 2005; Andrews and Jackman 2005), we are interested in whether winners and losers at the mass level are more or less likely to support institutional reforms. Several recent studies drawing on national and cross-national data find that citizens understood as electoral losers under a current set of institutional rules are more likely to support overhauling those procedures (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Banducci and Karp 1999; Wenzel, Bowler, and Lanoue 2000; Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Bowler and Donovan 2006; Anderson, et al. 2005; Donovan and Karp 2006; Dalton, Burklin, and Drummond 2001; Karp 2005; Norris 1999).

With respect to the American context, scholars have probed whether electoral losers have less political trust and are more likely to support institutional changes than winners. At the national level, Craig et al. (2006) find that over time that losers tend to have less political trust, satisfaction with democracy, and efficacy than winners (see also Donovan and Bowler 2004). They also find that following the controversial 2000 election, losers were more likely to question presidential legitimacy. Others report that following the contested 2000 presidential election, liberals were more supportive of election reforms, including a system of proportional representation (Donovan, Parry, and Bowler 2005). Studies examining winners and losers in the American states are far and few between, even though voters in several states are asked with increasing frequency to vote for institutional changes via the initiative process (Citrin 1995; Bowler, Donovan and Tolbert 1998). Karp (2005), for example, finds those who thought of themselves as losers in presidential contests, even after controlling for partisan identification, were more likely to support Colorado's 2004 ballot initiative to proportionally allocate the state's Electoral College votes.

As with the previous studies, we are interested in whether some citizens are more likely to support institutional change of election rules than others, depending on their status as winners or losers. Are those who *perceive* themselves to be election losers, or who *are* representational losers under a given system of redistricting, predisposed to support changes to the way districts are gerrymandered? Does either partisan control of the state legislature or representation at the district level condition the strategic choices of voters when it comes to supporting redistricting reform? Riker (1962, 1986) argued that political elites act strategically, manipulating institutions to their electoral benefit. We suggest that individual citizens may also act strategically when making decisions about institutions that give them political voice. This strategic choice might

also involve race, as many racial minorities are protected by legally gerrymandered majority-minority districts. Statewide systems mandating each district be drawn to maximize electoral competitiveness may dilute minority representation. Previous research has not considered how electoral loser status and race may interact in shaping support for institutional change, such as redistricting reform.

A final distinction between the present study and much of the previous literature is the outcome variable. With a few exceptions (including Karp), previous research has analyzed whether being a loser conditions “attitudes” about institutional change broadly defined; in contrast we analyze whether being an electoral loser (not perceptions of being a loser) affects voting for institutional change in the form of non-partisan redistricting. The opportunity to study actual voting behavior in a statewide referendum election provides external validity to our study.

Partisanship, Issue Voting and Support for Redistricting Reform

Since the turn of the 20th century, groups have turned to the initiative process in an effort to adopt a range of alternative governance policies. More recently, citizens have voted on governance ballot initiatives dealing with the regulation of campaign finance, the primary election system, same day voter registration, term limits, absentee voting and vote by mail, preferential (proportional) voting, and of course, legislative redistricting (Pippen, Bowler, and Donovan 2002; Karp 2005). Scholars have found that states with frequent usage of the initiative process tend to have a much higher adoption rate of governance policies/election reform than states that use the process less frequently, or that do not allow the process (Tolbert 2003).

According to numerous statewide polls, public support in many American states (including California and Ohio) for altering the way state and congressional legislative districts

are partitioned tends to run quite high. According to a statewide poll of 800 registered voters conducted in April 2006, California voters prefer redistricting to be done by an independent commission by a 3-to-1 margin (California Common Cause 2006). The poll, funded by three nonpartisan groups, found that a majority of Democratic, Republican, and Independent voters all supported an independent commission. Somewhat incredibly, over half of those Californian's polled in April who said they voted against Prop. 77 just five months earlier, claimed they preferred an independent redistricting commission. Similarly, in Ohio, just two months after more than two-thirds of Ohioans trounced Issue 4 at the polls, an independent survey conducted in January 2006 and funded by the nonpartisan Reform Institute (2006) found that 70% of Ohio voters supported more "balanced" and "competitive" congressional and legislative races, including more than half of all registered Republicans and Democrats. These survey results parallel those of a post-election November 2005 poll funded by the nonpartisan JEHT Foundation (2006).

If in the abstract, popular support for independent redistricting commissions is generally high, why did large majorities of citizens opt not to change the design of a political institution they widely held in contempt when they were given the opportunity at the polls? What explains this change in preferences toward altering an electoral institution such as redistricting?

One possible explanation, of course, is that voters were confused by the ballot measures. Not knowing fully what the consequences of the measures could be, they may have decided just to vote no in order to preserve the status quo (Magleby 1984; Bowler and Donovan 1998). Yet this possible explanation is rather thin. Scholars have shown that voters are able to make competent decisions on an array of complicated ballot propositions. Voters are able to use limited information, relying on simple shortcuts from the media, interest groups, and political

elites to make informed choices (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Nicholson 2003). As Lupia (1994: 63) demonstrates, by using shortcuts, most voters are able to “adapt their behavior to the complexity of electoral choice.”

Because the Ohio and California state legislatures are charged with drawing districts in both states, we suspect instead that an individual’s partisanship played a sizable role in the vote choice of those who participated in the off-year, nonpartisan election. Although voters in the two states had no explicit partisan cues on their physical ballots (such as party labels) on which to inform their decisions, voters likely used partisan cues to inform their vote choice. Partisan identification, after all, is one of the strongest and most consistent determinants of voting behavior on ballot propositions (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Branton 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2001, 2004). But partisanship alone is unlikely to explain the voting patterns on the two redistricting ballot measures. We suspect whether a citizen is a winner or a loser at both the statewide and district level of legislative representation provides a fuller account of why citizens voted to support or oppose the initiatives.

Defining Electoral Winners and Losers

In order to answer the question of whether losers are more likely to support institutional changes, such as ending the practice of gerrymandering by altering the way legislative districts are drawn, we need a definition of winners and losers that can be operationalized. Who should be considered to be a political winner or loser? An overview of previous research reveals that defining and operationalizing losers and winners is as much an art as it is a science. Scholars have classified individuals as losers and winners in a variety of ways. Using survey data, some scholars have used the results of a single election to determine whether a person is an electoral

loser or winner (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Norris 1999; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Banducci and Karp 1998; Donovan and Karp 2006). Under this schema, winners and losers at the mass level are usually categorized according to “an individual’s status as a supporter of the government or opposition” (Anderson et al. 2005: 10), with losers supporting a losing candidate or a political party in a previous national election that currently does not have governing power (Anderson and Guillory 1997). Alternatively, scholars have employed experimental survey designs to measure loser status through a subjective understanding of whether people over time “think of themselves as categorical losers in the electoral arena” (Bowler and Donovan 2006). Using a prospective question of electoral losses, for example, Donovan, Parry, and Bowler (2005: 157) ask respondents to think about candidates that they support in upcoming national, state, and local elections, coding those who reply “most of them might lose” as electoral losers.

Each approach in operationalizing an individual’s winner/loser status has its strengths and limitations. When relying on survey data, individuals may misreport (intentionally or otherwise) their vote in a single election, often overestimating their support for a winning candidate or party (Wright 1990). An election for a single national office may not accurately gauge an individual’s overall status as an electoral loser, because representation at the subnational level is not considered. Survey questions measuring “perceptions” of being an electoral loser compensate for the temporal vagaries of using a single election, but considerable noise can be introduced from having respondents characterize (inaccurately or otherwise) their memories or perceptions of past electoral losses. As Bowler and Donovan (2006) note self-critically, “people might discount losses in their memory, and recall instances when candidates they supported were winners.”

In contrast, our operationalization of loser status is not based on whether an individual supported a losing candidate (or party) in an election, irrespective of whether it is a fixed point in time point or a longitudinal self-assessment. Rather, informed by Bowler, Donovan, and Karp's (2006) investigation of how elites view possible alterations of electoral institutions and by Barretto, Segura, and Woods (2004) analysis of Latino turnout in majority-minority districts, we suggest there are two different lenses through which citizens might perceive whether they are representational winners or losers under a system of legislative districting. Both lenses are informed by an individual's party identification and how that individual is represented in the state legislature and congress.

First, we consider an individual to be a statewide representational loser if his or her party identification is at odds with the legislative party in control of policy making in the state legislature. In other words, we define those respondents who identify with the party in the legislative minority as losers. Many citizens may feel as though their partisanship is not being adequately taken into account by their state legislature as a whole. In California and Ohio, the control of the state legislature holds the key to a partisan gerrymander of both state legislative and congressional seats (McDonald 2006). We classify individuals whose party identification is synonymous with the minority party in the state legislature as "statewide legislative" losers.

Second, we define winner/loser status in terms of district level representation. Pairing the zip-codes of respondents with their party identification, we are able determine whether an individual is represented in the state House, state Senate, or U.S. House by legislators belonging to the same political party. Individuals who are represented by a majority of legislators from a different political party are considered district level losers. Following research showing that legislators tend to be more responsive to their own party's constituency (Shapiro et al. 1990), we

suggest that individuals who are losers at the district level may be less well represented (Fenno 1977). Under this schema, we consider a person to be a loser if his or her party identification does not coincide with that of at least two-thirds of his or her representatives (state House, state Senate, and U.S. House). We refer to individuals who are represented by elected state and federal legislators of another party as “district” losers. Using the concepts of statewide legislative losers and district losers we are able to measure electoral loser status at the mass level including subnational and national representation, building on (and possibly moving beyond) previous research using a single election or self-reported perceptions of being an electoral loser.

We acknowledge that operationalizing statewide loser status in part through the prism of party identification may have some limitations. For example, Anderson et al. (2005) and Nadeau and Blais (1993) find a limited impact of partisanship on the relationship between winner/loser status and support for political institutions. Craig et al. (2006), however, find that beyond presidential vote choice, partisanship in the American context has a significant effect on an individual’s general beliefs regarding electoral procedural fairness. Indeed, conceptualizing individuals as losers and winners in part through the enduring prism of an individual’s party identification (Green, Palmqest, and Schickler 2002) may be as reliable an indicator as using vote choice in the last national election, as used by most cross-national studies.

When evaluating support for institutional change at the state level, such as altering the way legislative districts are gerrymandered, an individual’s party identification may serve as a better indicator of winner/loser status than vote choice for a national candidate. For our purposes, evaluations of candidate support in a prior or upcoming national election may have little to do with an individual’s attitudes toward state-level electoral institutions and willingness to alter them. Additionally, there were no candidates—only initiatives and referendums—on the

November 2005 ballots in California and Ohio, so using a respondent's candidate vote choice to determine winner/loser status is not possible. For these reasons, we suggest that using party identification at the mass level paired with information about the partisanship of their elected representatives to measure the degree of partisan representation, serves as a reliable and direct empirical indicator of winner or loser status in subnational and national elections.

Research Hypotheses

Following some basic assumptions about the self-interest of citizens when given an opportunity to alter electoral institutions, we expect both statewide legislative and district losers to act strategically at the polls and support initiatives calling for alternative redistricting commissions.

Statewide Legislative Loser Hypothesis

We hypothesize, *ceteris paribus*, that support or opposition to non-partisan redistricting commissions can be explained by whether a citizen is a statewide legislative loser or not. A respondent's partisan identification is used to determine his or her winner/loser status. We expect Democrats (statewide legislative losers in Ohio) to be more supportive of institutional change/election reform than Republicans in Ohio, whereas we expect Republicans (statewide legislative losers in California) to be more supportive of the redistricting reform in California than Democrats.

District Loser Hypothesis

Beyond partisanship, we hypothesize that representational losers at the district level—those represented in the state legislature and in Congress by representatives of a political party

other than their own—will be more likely to support governance reforms to create more competitive elections, such as non-partisan redistricting. District-level losers are measured by the respondent’s partisanship combined with information about the party of the individual’s elected representatives to Congress (U.S. House) and the state legislature (Senate and House). If an individual has a different partisanship than the majority (at least two out of three) of his/her representatives at the district level he or she is considered a district loser.

Representation Interaction Hypothesis

There may also be important interaction effects between being a loser or a winner at the statewide legislative level, and being a loser at the district level. It is possible (and increasingly so due to partisan gerrymanders and majority-minority districts) that an individual is a loser at the statewide level, but a winner at local district level (see Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2006) for a parallel example among elites). The possible combinations of these two levels of representation can be mapped out by a simple 2 x 2 table pairing an individual’s representational winner/loser status at the statewide legislative level with his or her representational winner/loser status at the district level. [Figure 1 here] For example, there can be an individual who is a winner statewide (Republican in Ohio), but at the district level is a personal loser (represented by Democrats). Similarly, an individual may be a statewide loser (Democrat in Ohio), but be a personal winner (represented by a majority of Democrats at the district level). Because of the rational self-interest of most citizens, we expect that those respondents who were double representational losers—at both the statewide legislative and district levels—to be the most likely to support the California and Ohio ballot measures altering the process of legislative

redistricting. In contrast, we expect dual representational winners under the current system, and those with at least partial winner status, to vote to preserve the status quo.

Figure 1
Representational Winners and Losers

OHIO		Statewide Legislative	
District	Winner	Loser	
Winner	<u>Least</u> supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Republicans</i>)	More supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Democrats</i>)	
Loser	More supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Republicans</i>)	<u>Most</u> supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Democrats</i>)	
CALIFORNIA		Statewide Legislative	
District	Winner	Loser	
Winner	<u>Least</u> supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Democrats</i>)	More supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Republicans</i>)	
Loser	More supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Democrats</i>)	<u>Most</u> supportive of election reform/institutional change (<i>Republicans</i>)	

Race and Loser Hypothesis

Finally, we hypothesize there may be important interaction effects between race and strategic voting for redistricting reforms. Specially, white voters who are electoral losers at the district level (not protected by majority-minority districts), may be the most supportive of changing election institutions to create more competitive elections.

Ohio and California Opinion Samples

We test these hypotheses in the context of an off-year election with unique survey data from Ohio commissioned by the authors, as well Field Poll data from California. The electoral context is ideal, in that the media’s focus was on the ballot propositions rather than candidate

elections, as there were no gubernatorial, congressional, or presidential contests diverting their attention. This allows us to isolate media effects for the ballot propositions. Five measures appeared on Ohio's November 2005 ballot, including four rather high profile citizen initiatives bundled together by both supporters and opponents on election reform (a response to perceived voting problems in Ohio's 2004 presidential election) and one legislative referenda for economic development. Eight propositions appeared on California's November 2005 ballot, including four high profile measures, including Proposition 77, which were backed by Governor Schwarzenegger.

We draw on a large-scale panel survey (pre and post-election) conducted September-October 2005 of 1,076 Ohio registered voters, with a re-interview survey of 742 respondents conducted immediately after the November election.³ "The survey is a random telephone sample of Ohio citizens which included questions about awareness and support for the measures on the statewide ballot, as well as media sources and elite cues used by voters to make decision on the ballot measures. Questions on media use and partisan cues for issue campaigns have not been included in previous surveys on direct democracy in the states. As a comparison, we use the October 2005 California Field Poll survey of 676 California registered voters, randomly selected for telephone interviews conducted in English and Spanish.⁴ Both state opinion samples included nearly identical question wording about vote intentions for the non-partisan redistricting initiatives, and a follow-up question describing the ballot language, and then asking the

³ "The 2005 Ohio Ballot Initiatives" is a random sample of the Ohio citizens interviewed by telephone between September 28 and October 20, 2005 at the University of Akron Survey Research Center. The number of respondents was 1,076 and the margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points "The Ohio Ballot Initiatives Post-Election Survey" re-interviewed 746 of the 1076 original telephone respondents immediately after the November 2005 election, generating a 69% re-interview rate.

⁴ The survey was conducted October 18-24, 2005. To equalize the probability of telephone household selection from anywhere in the area sampled, samples are first systematically stratified to all counties in proportion to each county's share of telephone households statewide. San Francisco, CA, Field Research Corporation.

respondent whether they supported the substance of the proposal in principle. No post-election opinion data is available for California.

The outcome (or dependent) variable for both surveys measures support (either vote intentions or actual vote choice) for the redistricting reform ballot propositions. Three dependent variables are used for the Ohio analysis. In the pre-election survey, respondents were asked, “Still another proposed amendment would create a new five-member non-partisan commission appointed with the help of judges to redraw the lines for congressional and state legislative districts. The commission would be required to make competitive elections a primary factor in drawing new district lines. Are you aware of this amendment or not?” Respondents indicating “yes” were asked the follow-up question: “Given what you have heard so far do you favor or oppose the proposed redistricting commission amendment, or have you not made up your mind?” with responses including “yes,” “no” and “no opinion.” Individuals aware and who supported the redistricting measure were coded 1, with those opposed or unaware coded 0. As a robustness check, we estimate a second model where the dependent variable describes the language of the ballot proposition: “With regard to the proposed redistricting commission amendment, which of the following statements comes closest to your view?” Respondents choosing “the redistricting commission is a good idea because legislative elections will become more competitive” were coded 1, and those choosing “the redistricting commission is a bad idea because the commission won’t be accountable to the voters” were coded 0. In the sample, 540 Ohioans (or 58%) said the amendment was a bad idea, and 392 (42%) said a good idea. Finally, in the post-election Ohio wave respondents were asked “How did you vote on Issue 4 [redistricting commission amendment],” with “for” coded 1, and “against” coded 0.

Similar question wording was included in the California Field Poll. California

respondents were first asked if they were aware of Proposition 77—the redistricting measure—with responses including “yes, have heard” and “no, have not.”⁵ Those responding yes were asked their vote intentions, with supporters coded 1, and opponents or those with no opinion coded 0. There were 393 valid responses to the redistricting question, with 152 indicating support and 241 indicating opposition. As in Ohio, a third question asked vote preferences on Proposition 77 after being read the description of the ballot measure. After being read the ballot description, 188 people said “would vote yes,” while 267 said they “would vote no” and 89 indicated “no opinion.” Those indicating yes, were coded 1, and all others coded 0.

The primary explanatory (independent) variables measure individual partisanship (statewide legislative loser) and whether the individual is a representational loser at the district level. In both states, district level information measuring the party of the respondent’s congressional representative (U.S. House Member) and representatives to the Ohio or California legislature (House and Senate) were merged with the survey data.

In Ohio, our merged sample included 1,061 respondents. Of these 413 individuals resided in districts in which all three representatives (U.S. House, Ohio state Senate and House) were Republicans, while 134 individuals in the sample resided in districts in which all three representatives were Democrats. Following the literature finding independent leaners to vote as partisans in major candidate races (Keith et al. 1992), we first coded an individual’s partisanship using a standard seven-point measure. Democrats are those who self-identified strong, somewhat strong, or lean Democrat (coded 1), with all others coded 0. Republicans are those self-identifying as either a strong, somewhat strong, or lean Republican (coded 1), with all others coded 0. Pure independents and those identifying with an “other party” are coded as

⁵ Of the 1450 respondents in waves 1 and 2 of the field poll, 906 were not asked this question. Valid responses to this question included 393 “yes, have heard,” 153 “no, have not” and 16 don’t know.

independents. Thus, all Democrats (strong, somewhat strong, and lean) in Ohio are statewide legislative losers.

We created a second variable measuring whether the respondent was a district loser. Democrats who are represented by a majority of Republican lawmakers were coded 1, while Democrats residing in split districts or those in which a majority of their representatives are Democrat are coded 0. Similarly, Republicans residing in a district in which majority are Democrat were coded 1, and Republicans residing in split districts or those in the majority are Republican are coded 0 (not representational losers). Pure independents represented by either a majority of Democrat or Republican elected officials are coded losers (1).

This coding resulted in the following distribution: 546 respondents, or 51% of Ohio survey respondents, were district level losers in 2005, meaning that a majority (2/3^{rds} or more) of their elected representatives were from a different political party than their own. Cross-tabulating this variable by partisanship provides a measure of the extent of gerrymandering in Ohio at the district level. In Ohio, 53% of Democrats are district losers, while only 18% of Republicans are losers at the district level, a 30% point representation bias favoring Republicans. While 12 of Ohio's 18 U.S. House seats are held by Republicans (66%), even though just 50% of Ohioans voted Republican in the 2004 presidential election, this district-level variable provides an additional measure of the extent to which gerrymandering in Ohio has made Democrats representational losers.

In terms of coding independents, there is some controversy over the meaning of "independents," "independent leaners," and "pure independents." Although "leaners" have been observed to behave as partisans when they vote in two-candidate presidential elections through the 1980s (Keith et al. 1992), NES data from the 1990s and 2000s also show that a large category

of independent “leaners” more closely resemble pure independents than partisans on several attitudinal and behavioral markers, including propensity to support third party candidates and attitudes about the party system (Donovan, Parry, and Bowler 2005). In light of this finding, we might also expect independent leaners to support various types of election reforms, including redistricting commissions.

In the following multivariate regression models, then, partisanship is also measured a second way, allowing individuals who lean Republican or lean Democrat to be coded as independents. This is consistent with the literature showing that in non-presidential races, such as off-year or special election issue elections, independents are a meaningful category (Weisberg 1993) and may represent other form of identity politics (Lee and Hajnal forthcoming). Since this was an off, off-year election, in the baseline models to follow, strong and somewhat strong Republicans are coded 1, while Republican leaners are coded with independents, third party adherents, and Democrats as 0. Similarly, for the Democratic partisan binary variable, strong and somewhat strong Democrats are coded as 1, while Democrat leaners, pure independents, those belonging to other parties, and Republicans are coded 0. We compare the results when partisans are defined using only those identifying as strong and somewhat strong, to a definition of partisanship that include all three categories: strong, moderate, and leaners.⁶

We employ a similar coding scheme for the California survey data, but we adapted it slightly because of question wording. Individual partisanship in the California survey is measured with the only available question; a four-point party registration question was asked, with choices for “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Non-partisan/Independent” or “Green/Libertarian/American Independent/Reform/Other Party.” Respondents indicating

⁶ The correlation between the two variables representing Democratic partisans is .85 ($p < .000$). The correlation between the two variables measuring Republican partisans is .89 ($p < .000$).

independent or support for third or other party were coded as independent. Those indicating Republican were coded 1 for the binary variable measuring Republican and all others 0. Those responding Democrat were coded 1 for the binary variable measuring Democrat, and all other 0. Similar findings in terms of partisan support for non-partisan redistricting in both states suggest that the models are not sensitive to measurement variation in term question wording.

We again merge our individual level measure of partisanship with a contextual variable measuring the party affiliation of the respondent's elected representatives to create a district loser variable for the California opinion data. In waves 1 and 2 of the California Field Poll, 657 individuals of 1,382 were coded as district-level losers; for these individuals, a majority of their representatives (U.S. House and both chambers of the California legislature) belonged to a different political party. Similar to the Ohio sample, overall 48% of Californians are representational losers. Cross-tabulating our district-level loser variable with partisanship reveals that 49% of California Republicans are dual losers, versus only 31% of California Democrats. Thus California's gerrymandering results in only a 10% representation in favor of the Democratic party, compared to a 30% bias in favor the Republican party in Ohio. By this measure, gerrymandering in California may be less severe than in Ohio.

A critical component of the statewide legislative loser hypothesis is the presence of elite cues either in support or opposition to the ballot proposition which can allow voters to make rational decisions (Lupia 1994) and also condition voting in issue elections along partisan lines (Branton 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2004). As was the case with other ballot measures in 2004, California Governor Schwarzenegger was a primary sponsor and vocal proponent of Proposition 77. The Field Poll included a unique question that measured the personal effect of "Governor Schwarzenegger's support of a ballot measure." Those responding "more inclined to vote yes"

were coded 1, and those responding “more included to vote no” or “no effect” were coded 0.

This variable allows us to directly measure the effect of partisan elite cues in voting for a ballot initiative.

In Ohio, redistricting did not have such a high profile supporter (although Governor Schwarzenegger did lend his support to the Ohio initiative near the end of the campaign). Instead, the post-election sample included a series of media exposure/use questions that allow us to measure a similar phenomenon. The question asked “how important in the voting decision” was “endorsements by political parties.” Responses to this three-point scaled question ranged from “very important” (coded 3) to “not at all important” (coded 1). Since the issues were the primary focus of the election (without major candidate races), this question measures elite cues for the four initiatives and one referendum on the ballot. Additional media use and mobilization variables were also included in the Ohio models, measuring the importance of TV and radio news, Newspaper stories, Newspaper endorsements, TV ads, phone mobilization, mailings, and endorsements for the ballot propositions by interest groups. In each case, a four-point scale measured responses, with higher values indicating the media source or mobilization was “very important” (coded 4) in the respondent’s voting decision.

Control variables are selected to avoid bias in estimating the effects of strategic voting for the redistricting ballot measures. Variables are coded to be as similar as possible in both state samples, but vary slightly because data availability. In Ohio and California opinion samples we control for standard demographic factors, including age (measured in years), a binary variable for gender (males coded 1, females 0), education,⁷ income,⁸ and race (binary variable for white

⁷ In Ohio, self-reported education is measured on a six-point ordinal scale from 1 (grades 1-6) to 6 (post graduate work). In California, education is measured on a ten-point scale from 1 (under 8th grade) to 10 (“graduate work past master’s degree”). Higher values indicate increased education in both surveys.

coded 1, all others 0). Because African Americans are the dominant minority group in Ohio, and are largely ‘packed’ into majority-minority legislative districts, the binary variable for white race measures a white versus black voter. In contrast Latinos are the dominant minority group in California’s population. Evaluations of the economy have been found to be important in voting on ballot propositions (Bowler and Donovan 1994). Ohio respondents were asked, “Is the state economy on the right or the wrong track?” Those indicating wrong track (poor economic evaluations) were coded 1, and those indicating right track coded 0. California respondents were asked about the overall direction of California’s economy, with those indicating poor (coded 1) and other responses coded 0. Religion, especially evangelical/fundamentalist Christian, has become increasingly important in American elections (Campbell 2006). To account for this phenomenon, we include a binary variable measuring whether the respondent is a born again Christian (coded 1) with all others coded 0. Our models of strategic voting based on a respondent’s status as a representational winner or loser might be seen as biased, unless we control for general interest in the election. In both Ohio (post-election sample only) and California we include an ordinal variable measuring general interest in the election, with higher scores indicating increased attention to the election.⁹

Beyond loser/winner status at the statewide and district levels, we also want to control for whether those who were most concerned about political corruption would support redistricting reform. Attitudes about specific institutional elements of the election system may be independent of general sentiments about politics, such as satisfaction with how democracy is currently

⁸ In Ohio, total yearly family income is measured on a five-point scale from 1 (under \$18,000) to 5 (over \$72,000), with higher values indicating increased wealth. In California, yearly total household income is also measured on a five-point scale from 1 (under \$20,000) to 5 (over \$80,000).

⁹ In the Ohio sample, a three-point scaled question measures how closely the respondent is following the 2005, from “very closely” (coded 3) to “not very closely” (coded 1). In California, an ordinal four-point scale measures “how closely have you been following news about the special election” with “very closely” (coded 4), and “not at all” (coded 1).

working (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006). We hypothesize that citizens who are concerned about corruption will be more likely to support election reform, including redistricting commissions to limit partisan gerrymandering. Unfortunately the California survey did not include a question on corruption, but the Ohio surveys included both pre and post-election questions measuring attitudes about political corruption in the state, with slight variations in question wording. These variables are included in the appropriate models to test whether those most concerned with political corruption are more likely to vote for redistricting commissions.¹⁰

Findings—Ohio

We begin our analysis by focusing on the swing-state of Ohio, given the larger sample size and panel survey data with pre and post-elections waves. Since the dependent variables reported in Table 1 are binary, logistic regression coefficients are reported. Table 1 measures partisans allowing leaning Democrats and Republican to be coded as independents. As a comparison, Table 2 includes identical models, but leaning independents are coded as partisans (either Democrat or Republican), not as independents. While the findings about the strength of partisanship in predicting support for redistricting reform are comparable, the effect of partisanship in predicting voting behavior is stronger and more consistent in Table 2 when independent leaners are coded as partisans, not as independents. This suggests that how we code partisanship matters, and may affect our results. It also indicates that beyond major candidate races (Keith et al. 1992), independents who are partisan leaners may think about ballot issues through partisan lenses (Branton 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2001, 2004).

¹⁰ The post election question asked respondents “if corruption is a serious problem in Ohio” with responses ranging from “a serious problem” (coded 3), “somewhat of a problem” (coded 2) to “not a problem” (coded 1). The pre-election variable measured corruption with varying question wording, and asked the respondent their level of disgust with Ohio politics. Those responding “disgusted” were coded 3, and those satisfied coded 1, with those neither disgusted or satisfied coded 2.

In both Tables 1 and 2, models 1 and 2 measure whether statewide legislative losers (Democrats in Ohio) are more likely to support non-partisan redistricting using the pre-election survey data. Controlling for other demographic, economic and social factors, as well as for partisan elite cuing, we find Democrats to be significantly more likely to indicate an intention to vote for the redistricting commission (Model 1) when independent leaners are coded as partisans (Table 2), but not when partisan leaders are coded as independents (Table 1). However, when read descriptions of what the ballot proposition would do in the abstract, Democrats were more likely to support the idea of more competitive elections (Model 2), than Republicans and independents regardless of how independent leaners are measured (Tables 1 and 2). This suggests that voting for changing political institutions through redistricting may be strategic, and conditioned by being a loser at the statewide level.

Models 3 and 4 (Tables 1 and 2) replicate these models, but control for Republicans (partisan winners statewide) to confirm the models are robust to model specification choices. Again, Republicans are significantly less likely to say they support election reform (redistricting), and are less supportive of competitive elections in the abstract. The other notable finding is gender, as males are more in favor of redistricting commissions/competitive elections in Ohio, regardless of party, than females. Little in the published research has linked gender with preferences for election reform, but this may be an avenue for future research. The analysis provides support for our statewide legislative loser hypothesis in Ohio.

Table 3 replicates the models of vote intentions for the redistricting commission ballot measure, again using the pre-election survey data, but includes our critical variable measuring whether the respondent is a district level loser (beyond partisanship/statewide legislative winner or loser). In Column 1 we see that overall, district-level losers in Ohio were slightly more likely

to support the redistricting reform initiative (almost 85% confidence interval). However, there is evidence to suggest that race and district loser status may interact. African Americans are the largest minority group in Ohio, and while they are predominantly Democrats, many reside in majority-minority districts in urban areas that nearly guarantee representation by a black state legislator or member of Congress. Thus, African Americans may strategically oppose redistricting reforms, for fear of losing some descriptive representation at the district level. White district-level losers in Ohio may be the most concerned about gerrymandering and the lack of competitive elections. The model in Column 2 includes an interaction term (white race * district loser). The coefficient for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of being a loser at the district level in Ohio elections is conditioned by race. Whites who are losers at the district level (i.e., a majority of their elected representatives are of a different political party), are significantly more likely to support the redistricting reform ballot measure, compared to whites who are not district-level losers.

This is an important finding, as it shows how race and strategic voting by losers may interact. It builds on previous published work on the preferences of electoral losers (Bowler and Donovan 2006; Anderson et al. 2005; Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006), injecting race into the equation. The reason blacks might be less inclined to support the redistricting commission reform in Ohio may be due to the fact that the commission would have had to adopt a plan that made all state and federal legislative districts as competitive as possible, reducing the chances African Americans would be gerrymandered into a majority-minority district. Model 3 (Table 3) replicates the interaction term model in Model 2, but includes a control for partisanship, allowing independent leaners to be coded as independents. (The findings are unchanged when Democratic partisanship is measured with Democratic leaners as partisans not independents) Beyond

statewide loser status (as measured by partisanship), white losers at the district level in Ohio appear to be the most supportive of election reform to create more competitive elections.

Finally, Model 4 measures whether being a district loser is conditioned by being a statewide loser. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that partisans (Democrats or Republicans) who are regular losers in Ohio politics at the district level are the ones most supportive of non-partisan redistricting, and not independents who are also district-level losers.

Across the models in Table 3 we again see the coefficient for gender is statistically significant, with males more likely to vote for Issue 4 than females. Those with higher education are also more supportive of competitive elections, as are those with higher incomes. There is some support for the importance of the economy in issue voting, as those most concerned with Ohio's poor economy are more likely to support for election reform (90% confidence interval). In the two pre-election survey models, however, the coefficient for the variable measuring concern with political corruption ("disgust" with Ohio politics) is not statistically significant.

It is noteworthy that in Table 3 when we control for district level loser, the covariate for partisanship/statewide legislative loser fails to achieve statistical significance. This suggests that district losers may be the more important concept. In sum, drawing on the pre-election opinion data from Ohio we have evidence to support our statewide legislative loser hypothesis (when district losers is not included in the model) and our district loser hypothesis, but the latter effect is conditioned by the race of the respondent.

Table 4 draws on the post-election Ohio panel wave, replicating the baseline model but including the control for interest in the election, which was only asked in the post-election sample. The dependent variable is now the reported vote either for or against Issue 4, rather than

vote intentions. Again, we compare the findings when partisanship is measured by only strong and moderate partisans (Model 1 and 2), and when leaners are coded as partisans (Models 3 and 4). Here, the findings are identical regardless of how independent leaners are coded.

Consistent with the pre-election data analysis, we find evidence that statewide loser/winner status (using the party identification proxy) matters. Democrats (consistent statewide losers in Ohio politics statewide) are significantly more likely to support the redistricting commission reforms to limit the practice of partisan gerrymandering than Republicans or independents. This provides additional evidence for our statewide legislative loser hypothesis.

Improving our model specification with the control for general political interest in the post-election sample, we see that district level losers (regardless of race) are more likely to support changing political institutions by voting for election reform. The coefficient for the district level loser variable is positive and statistically significant, regardless of the set of control variables included, and regardless of our coding of partisanship. This is compelling evidence that district-level losers vote strategically for election reform, and are more in favor of changing the rules of the political system, which is consistent with recent literature (Bowler and Donovan 2006; Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006; Anderson et al. 2005).

The models in Table 4 also include the post-election question wording for political corruption. In contrast to the pre-election survey, we find evidence that attitudes towards political corruption matters, as those more concerned about corruption in Ohio politics are more likely to support changing the political system by voting for the redistricting ballot measure. With the included control for political interest, gender fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance. This may be because males tend to be more interested in politics than females. We

do see that those who are more interested in the election (and likely more informed) are more likely to vote for redistricting reform.

Models 2 and 4 add in additional variables measuring elite cuing and importance of media exposure in voting decisions. Even with this extensive set of control variables, we see Democratic partisans (statewide losers) are more likely to vote for Issue 4, as are district losers. Those who are more concerned about corruption in Ohio politics are more likely to vote for the ballot initiative. Some of the media exposure variables are also important, but not endorsements by political parties. With a 90% confidence interval, those noting that print news was very important in their voting decision were more likely to vote for the redistricting commission amendment. This is consistent with published literature showing that voters learn more from print media than TV or radio (Smith 1989), and that information from the media is important when citizens vote on ballot propositions (Nicholson 2003). However, respondents indicating that newspaper endorsement/editorials were the most important in their voting decision were statistically less likely to support the ballot propositions, all else equal. As should be expected, the editorial pages of most major newspapers in Ohio were opposed to Issue 4, and it is notable that individuals who found the editorial pages most important were opposed to the ballot proposition. Finally, those relying on Internet/email news about the ballot propositions were significantly more likely to support the reforms. This is consistent with a growing literature on the importance of online news in voting and elections (Tolbert and McNeal 2003; Bimber 2003). Variables measuring TV ads were not statistically significant, in contrast to some recent research based on aggregate data for ballot propositions (Stratman 2006), nor were those measuring endorsements by political parties or interest groups, or phone or mail mobilization.

Findings—California

Table 5 repeats the models for the California opinion sample. We see in Models 1 and 2 that Republican partisans are significantly more likely to support Proposition 77 than Democrats or independents. This is expected, as Republicans are statewide legislative losers in the state. Independents and those registered with a third party in California are not statically different than Democrats. The size of the coefficient for Republican partisanship remains comparable whether the dependent variable is intention to vote in favor of the redistricting reforms (Model 1), or support for the redistricting proposal after being read the ballot description (Model 2). Not surprisingly, Models 3 and 4 show Democrats and independents in California are significantly less likely to vote for redistricting reform than Republican partisans. More importantly, those who were more inclined to vote “yes” on the ballot proposition because of Governor Schwarzenegger’s endorsement were significantly more likely to vote for the redistricting ballot measure, even after controlling for partisanship. This is direct evidence that elite partisan cues matter and can shape voting in issue elections (Nicholson 2003; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Even with a control for general interest in the election, we find that males are more supportive of election reform. The robustness of this finding across two states and multiple surveys suggests the finding is real. Mirroring the Ohio case study, then, we find strong evidence to support the statewide legislative loser hypothesis in California.

Lacking a post-election sample and given the small number of cases, we have less confidence in the findings from California. Nevertheless, Table 6 (Model 1) suggests that representational losers at the district level are not more likely to support non-partisan redistricting. Being a district-level loser does not appear to be conditioned by race, as the interaction term (white race * district loser in Model 2, and Latino ethnicity * district loser in

Model 3) also do not provide support for the representational hypothesis. In California, being a loser at the district level is not conditioned by race, as it is in Ohio. This may partly occur because Latinos in California do not benefit for majority-minority congressional districts in the state to the same extent that African Americans do in Ohio. However, Model 5 suggests that district loser status is conditioned by partisanship. Independents in California who are representational losers are considerably more likely to support changing the rules of the political system than partisans who are losers at the district level, which is the opposite of the findings from Ohio. This is an intriguing finding, especially given that independents represent a larger share of the population in California than Ohio (see Donovan and Bowler 2004). It also is consistent with some research on California showing the electoral importance of independents (Lee and Hajnal forthcoming; Cain and Gerber 2002; Baldassarre 2000).

Conclusion

Riker (1962, 1986) argued that political elites act strategically, manipulating institutions for their electoral benefit. Building on the literature, we find compelling evidence that the mass public may also act strategically when making decisions about institutional change, as electoral losers are significantly more likely to support or vote for modifying electoral institutions. We find support for redistricting reform is contingent on loser status at the statewide legislative level and district level. While the findings are mixed regarding district level representation (stronger findings from Ohio), in general, we present evidence that “losers” statewide and at the district level are more likely to support efforts to create more competitive elections through redistricting reform. While it may be in the self-interest of statewide legislative losers (Democrats in Ohio and Republicans in California) to support changing the way redistricting is determined, some of these individuals (in particular, African Americans) may benefit at the district level from the

current method of gerrymandering, which dampens their support for broader institutional change. Beyond defining losers by candidate preferences in the last election or perceptions of being an electoral loser, we find evidence that individuals who are electoral losers (represented by elected officials of a different political party at the statewide and district levels) are significantly more supportive of institutional change. We also find evidence that race and loser status may interact, shaping voting behavior. The analysis adds weight to a growing body of literature suggesting that strategic voting matters, especially in terms of “reforming the republic” (Donovan and Bowler 2004). As such, the research may have implications for future attempts to reform American electoral institutions in other states.

The findings are particularly timely. In 2006, the United States Supreme Court gave state legislatures broad power to gerrymander state and congressional legislative districts along partisan lines. In its decision *League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry*, the court ruled that states may redraw legislative districts at any time, even mid-decade. In previous decisions, a majority on the court has expressed skepticism that claims of political gerrymandering are even justiciable. Despite the prospect of increased gerrymandering at the state level, government groups hoping to use the initiative process to alter the rules of the redistricting game face an uphill battle. As such, legislative redistricting done by state legislatures is likely to continue to be “bipartisan,” with extremely safe districts created for candidates of both parties, and relatively few competitive districts.

Though voters may not “see the lines” of legislative districts drawn by state legislatures, they are savvy enough to know whether they are representational winners or losers at the state and district levels. By isolating the vote choice on redistricting reform ballot measures, we are able to demonstrate how citizens voted strategically for and against the measures in California

and Ohio not only because of statewide partisan and representation considerations, but also because of district-level considerations.

Table 1: Testing the Statewide Legislative Loser Hypothesis, Ohio Pre-election Survey Data (Democrat and Republican Leaners coded as Independent)

	Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description		Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description	
	b (s.e.)	p>z	B (S.E)	p>z	B (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z
Statewide Legislative Loser (Strong & Moderate Democrat)	.27 (.28)	.324	.27 (.14)	.061				
Statewide Legislative Winner (Strong & Moderate Republican)					-.53 (.31)	.086	-.26 (.15)	.095
Age	.03 (.93 ⁻²)	.000	.32 ⁻³ (.43 ⁻²)	.940	.03 (.92 ⁻²)	.000	.47 ⁻³ (.43 ⁻²)	.914
Male	.65 (.28)	.022	.04 (.14)	.754	.64 (.27)	.021	.02 (.14)	.882
Education	.30 (.13)	.020	-.06 (.06)	.333	.30 (.12)	.017	-.06 (.06)	.356
Income	.23 (.11)	.020	.72 ⁻³ (.05)	.990	.25 (.11)	.033	.65 ⁻² (.05)	.909
White	.59 (.49)	.228	.37 (.21)	.077	.63 (.50)	.206	.36 (.21)	.084
Ohio Economy Poor	.62 (.34)	.072	-.11 (.15)	.466	.60 (.34)	.078	-.10 (.15)	.471
Ohio Politics Corrupt	.32 (.21)	.140	-.17 (.12)	.150	.26 (.21)	.214	-.19 (.12)	.114
Born again Christian	-.54 (.33)	.104	-.07 (.14)	.591	-.49 (.33)	.135	-.06 (.14)	.658
Constant	-8.52 (1.14)	.000	-.23 (.48)	.636	-8.26 (1.10)	.000	-.03 (.47)	.944
N	945		945		945		945	
Wald Chi ²	56.67	.000	10.48	.313	57.55	.000	9.61	.3831
Pseudo R ²	.11		.01		.12		.01	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to control for heteroskedascitiy. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: “The 2005 Ohio Ballot Initiatives” is a random sample of the Ohio citizens interviewed by telephone between September 28 and October 20, 2005 at the University of Akron Survey Research Center. The number of respondents is 1,076.

Table 2: Testing the Statewide Legislative Loser Hypothesis, Ohio Pre-election Survey Data (Democrat and Republican Leaners coded as Partisans)

	Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description		Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description	
	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (S.E)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z
Statewide Legislative Loser (Strong, Moderate, & Leaning Democrat)	1.01 (.28)	.000	.50 (.14)	.000				
Statewide Legislative Winner (Strong, Moderate, & Leaning Republican)					-.70 (.31)	.026	-.33 (.15)	.029
Age	.03 (.90 ⁻²)	.000	.31 ⁻³ (.00)	.942	.03 (.92 ⁻²)	.000	.57 ⁻³ (.43 ⁻²)	.894
Male	.81 (.28)	.005	.08 (.14)	.544	.68 (.28)	.015	.03 (.14)	.821
Education	.31 (.13)	.017	-.06 (.06)	.352	.31 (.13)	.015	-.05 (.06)	.402
Income	.24 (.11)	.043	.56 ⁻³ (.05)	.992	.26 (.11)	.026	.01 (.05)	.829
White	.65 (.49)	.183	.43 (.21)	.043	.65 (.49)	.189	.38 (.21)	.066
Ohio Economy Poor	.52 (.33)	.120	-.13(.15)	.360	.59 (.34)	.083	-.11 (.15)	.453
Ohio Politics Corrupt	.20 (.21)	.335	-.20 (.12)	.088	.20 (.22)	.358	-.21 (.12)	.084
Born again Christian	-.43 (.34)	.202	-.04 (.15)	.771	-.46 (.33)	.166	-.05 (.14)	.734
Constant	-8.85 (1.01)	.000	-.36 (.48)	.458	-8.18 (1.08)	.000	-.02 (.47)	.956
N	945		945		945		945	
Wald Chi ²	62.56	.000	19.30	.022	58.72	.000	11.68	.231
Pseudo R ²	.14		.02		.12		.02	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to control for heteroskedascitiy. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: “The 2005 Ohio Ballot Initiatives” is a random sample of the Ohio citizens interviewed by telephone between September 28 and October 20, 2005 at the University of Akron Survey Research Center. The number of respondents is 1,076.

Table 3: Testing the Electoral/District Loser Hypothesis, Ohio Pre-election Survey Data

	Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting							
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	B(s.e.)	p>z	b(s.e.)	p>z	b(s.e.)	p>z	b(s.e.)	p>z
District Level Loser	.36 (.26)	.168	-1.64 (1.11)	.140	-1.60 (1.10)	.145	.64 (.37)	.089
White * District Loser			2.17 (1.14)	.050	2.12 (1.14)	.063		
Independent * District Loser							-1.10 (.60)	.067
Statewide Legislative Loser (Strong & Mod. Democrat)	.24 (.27)	.378			.24 (.28)	.396	.27 (.40)	.505
Independent							.92 (.45)	.045
Age	.03 (.95 ⁻²)	.000	.03 (.95 ⁻²)	.000	.03 (.94 ⁻²)	.000	.03 (.95 ⁻²)	.000
Male	.64 (.28)	.024	.61 (.27)	.028	.67 (.29)	.022	.65 (.28)	.023
Education	.31 (.12)	.016	.32 (.13)	.013	.32 (.13)	.013	.29 (.13)	.023
Income	.24 (.11)	.039	.24 (.11)	.043	.23 (.12)	.050	.24 (.11)	.040
White	.56 (.49)	.252	-.34 (.59)	.563	-.30 (.60)	.615	.59 (.50)	.234
Black								
Ohio Economy Poor	.63 (.33)	.061	.63 (.33)	.061	.60 (.34)	.077	.63 (.34)	.062
Ohio Politics Corrupt	.29 (.21)	.182	.31 (.21)	.140	.30 (.21)	.164	.28 (.21)	.172
Born again Christian	-.54 (.34)	.109	-.56 (.34)	.099	-.53 (.34)	.115	-.54 (.33)	.102
Constant	-8.72 (1.19)	.000	-7.95 (1.18)	.000	-8.01 (1.18)	.000	-8.86 (1.18)	.000
N	943		954		943		943	
Wald Chi ²	56.20	.000	62.36	.000	62.03	.000	63.88	.000
Pseudo R ²	.12		.12		.13		.13	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to control for heteroskedascitiy. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: “The 2005 Ohio Ballot Initiatives” is a random sample of the Ohio citizens interviewed by telephone between September 28 and October 20, 2005 at the University of Akron Survey Research Center. The number of respondents is 1,076.

Table 4: Testing the Electoral/District Loser Hypothesis with Campaign Effects Controls, Ohio Post-election Survey Data

	Voted for Non-Partisan Redistricting—Issue 4							
	Democrat=Strong and Moderate				Democrat=Strong, Moderate and Leaner			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z
District Loser	.70 (.23)	.000	.78 (.24)	.001	.65 (.23)	.006	.73 (.24)	.003
Statewide Legislative Loser (Democrat)	1.42 (.24)	.000	1.48 (.25)	.000	1.59 (.25)	.000	1.70 (.26)	.000
Age	.01 (.88 ⁻²)	.062	.02 (.01)	.019	.01 (.89 ⁻²)	.072	.02 (.98 ⁻²)	.017
Male	.35 (.24)	.153	.28 (.26)	.280	.37 (.24)	.123	.29 (.25)	.248
Education	.19 (.11)	.088	.09 (.12)	.455	.20 (.11)	.092	.08 (.12)	.497
Income	.33 (.11)	.002	.33 (.11)	.004	.31 (.11)	.005	.30 (.11)	.009
White	-.53 (.35)	.136	-.47 (.36)	.192	-.54 (.35)	.118	-.49 (.35)	.171
Ohio Economy Poor	-.16 (.27)	.546	-.12 (.29)	.677	-.24 (.27)	.381	-.22 (.29)	.444
Ohio Politics Corrupt	.81 (.20)	.000	.77 (.21)	.000	.73 (.20)	.000	.71 (.21)	.001
Born again Christian	-.25 (.27)	.353	-.32 (.28)	.252	-.16 (.28)	.562	-.22 (.29)	.446
Interest in 2005 Election	.45 (.20)	.024	.42 (.21)	.051	.49 (.20)	.016	.45 (.22)	.041
Importance to Voting Decision								
Exposure TV news about ballot propositions			-.11 (.20)	.571			-.08 (.19)	.667
Newspaper stories			.30 (.18)	.100			.31 (.19)	.100
Newspaper endorsements			-.48 (.22)	.030			-.56 (.21)	.009
Internet news			.46 (.20)	.022			.49 (.20)	.016
TV ads			-.12 (.23)	.599			-.15 (.24)	.524
Phone Mobilization			-.03 (.25)	.877			-.02 (.25)	.993
Mailings			.21 (.18)	.258			.14 (.18)	.446
Endorsements by political parties			.05 (.21)	.793			.08 (.21)	.372
Endorsements by interest groups			.22 (.21)	.283			.19 (.21)	.372
Constant	-7.28 (1.09)	.000	-8.08 (1.40)	.000	-7.25 (1.09)	.000	-7.89 (1.39)	.000
N	479		469		479		469	
Wald Chi ²	85.45	.000	101.08	.000	89.94	.000	104.93	.000
PseudoR ²	.20		.23		.21		.25	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to control for heteroskedascity. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: “The Ohio Ballot Initiatives Post-Election Survey” re-interviewed 746 of the 1076 original telephone respondents immediately after the November 2005 election conducted by the University of Akron Survey Research Center.

Table 5: Testing the Partisan Priming Hypothesis, California Pre-election Survey Data

	Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description		Intend to Vote for Non-Partisan Redistricting Commission		Support Redistricting when read ballot description	
	b (s.e)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z	b (s.e.)	p>z
Statewide Legislative Loser (Republican)	1.66 (.38)	.000	1.24 (.29)	.000				
Statewide Legislative Winner (Democrat)					-1.66 (.38)	.000	-1.24 (.29)	.000
Independent/3 rd Party	.57 (.37)	.130	.53 (.32)	.104	-1.09 (.41)	.009	-.70 (.34)	.039
More inclined to vote "yes" because of Governor Schwarzenegger's endorsement	2.33 (.41)	.000	1.66 (.28)	.000	2.33 (.41)	.000	1.66 (.28)	.000
Interest in special election	-.20 (.26)	.426	.15 (.20)	.438	-.20 (.26)	.426	.15 (.20)	.438
Age	.01 (.01)	.277	.71 ⁻² (.81 ⁻²)	.381	.01 (.01)	.277	.71 ⁻² (.81 ⁻²)	.381
White	.43 (.34)	.207	.22 (.28)	.420	.43 (.34)	.207	.22 (.28)	.420
Male	.68 (.30)	.024	.61 (.24)	.010	.68 (.30)	.024	.61 (.24)	.010
Income	.03 (.13)	.798	.03 (.09)	.722	.03 (.13)	.798	.03 (.09)	.722
Education	.03 (.07)	.606	.04 (.06)	.419	.03 (.07)	.606	.04 (.06)	.419
Born again Christian	.06 (.37)	.863	.19 (.29)	.505	.06 (.37)	.863	.19 (.29)	.505
CA Economy Poor	.14 (.34)	.674	.26 (.26)	.315	.14 (.34)	.674	.26 (.26)	.315
Constant	-2.92 (1.26)	.020	-3.66 (.98)	.000	-1.25 (1.30)	.334	-2.42 (.97)	.013
N	324		442		324		442	
Wald Chi ²	77.07	.000	92.05	.000	77.07	.000	92.05	.000
Pseudo R ²	.32		.20		.32		.20	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to control for heteroskedascity. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: 2005 California Field Poll (#05-04), Wave 1 of 676 California residents random telephone interview sample conducted in English and Spanish October 18-24. To equalize the probability of telephone household selection from anywhere in the area sampled, samples are first systematically stratified to all counties in proportion to each county's share of telephone households statewide. San Francisco, CA, Field Research Corporation.

Table 6: Testing the Electoral/District Loser Hypothesis, California Pre-election Survey Data

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b (s.e)	p>z	b (s.e)	p>z	b (s.e)	p>z	b (s.e)	p>z
District Loser	-.29 (.30)	.339	-.18 (.65)	.782	-.41 (.32)	.206	-.83 (.42)	.050
White * District Loser			-.13 (.73)	.849				
Latino * District Loser					1.09 (.83)	.217		
Independent * District Loser							1.19 (.53)	.025
Statewide Legislative Loser (Republican)	1.40 (.35)	.000	1.41 (.35)	.000	1.46 (.33)	.000	1.74 (.38)	.000
Interest in special election	-.20 (.25)	.427	-.20 (.25)	.420	-.19 (.25)	.425	-.24 (.24)	.329
More inclined to vote "yes" because of Governor Schwarzenegger's support for ballot measure	2.44 (.40)	.000	2.44 (.40)	.000	2.44 (.40)	.000	2.52 (.41)	.000
Age	.76 ⁻² (.01)	.487	.77 ⁻² (.01)	.484	.97 ⁻² (.01)	.365	.01 (.01)	.284
White	.43 (.35)	.216	.48 (.39)	.214			.53 (.34)	.122
Latino					-.54 (.47)	.251		
Male	.76 (.30)	.012	.76 (.30)	.011	.76 (.29)	.011	.71 (.30)	.021
Income	.01 (.13)	.922	.01 (.13)	.916	.02 (.13)	.822	.03 (.13)	.819
Education	.03 (.07)	.647	.03 (.07)	.656	.04 (.07)	.529	.03 (.07)	.653
Born again Christian	.09 (.37)	.797	.10 (.37)	.784			.08 (.37)	.813
CA economy poor	.27 (.33)	.416	.27 (.33)	.416	.36 (.32)	.273	.17 (.33)	.592
Constant	-2.39 (1.27)	.060	-2.43 (1.28)	.059	-2.28 (1.27)	.073	-2.71 (1.24)	.029
N	323		323		325		325	
Wald Chi ²	83.20	.000	85.75	.000	86.43	.000	86.43	.000
Pseudo R ²	.32		.32		.31		.31	

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses to control for heteroskedascitiy. Probabilities based on two-tailed test.

Source: 2005 California Field Poll (#05-04), Wave 1 of 676 California residents random telephone interview sample conducted in English and Spanish October 18-24. To equalize the probability of telephone household selection from anywhere in the area sampled, samples are first systematically stratified to all counties in proportion to each county's share of telephone households statewide. San Francisco, CA, Field Research Corporation.

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